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 ABSTRACT
 To clearly grasp the importance of  science, we need to start 
acknowledging the value of  knowledge as constituted by two 
criteria: its utility and its reliability. However, there are questions 
concerning the interpretation of  both notions. Fortunately, the 
problem is solvable. The meaning of  utility becomes clear when 
we distinguish between two possible forms of  utility: expected and 
achieved utilities. The meaning of  reliability becomes clear when 
we recognize which form of  reliability is the one that is truly 
achievable.
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or long, truth has been divided into two classes only: necessary and Fcontingent truths. Thus, the special importance of  science could only 
be understood on the ground that it tells us something about the world that is 
necessarily true, i.e., the Kantian synthetic a priori judgment. In the history 
of  philosophy, this manner of  thinking has long been dominant. This 
dominance explains why Husserl can confidently make the claim that “we 
[…] recognize that the Cartesian idea of  a science (ultimately an all-
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embracing science) grounded on an absolute foundation, and absolutely 
justified, is none other than the idea that constantly furnishes guidance in all sciences and 
in their striving toward universality whatever may be the situation with 
1
respect to a de facto actualization of  that idea.”  
 Nevertheless, this long-respected belief  is false. The epistemic hierarchy 
it gives completely misses what we aspire to from knowledge. To grasp this 
point, we only need to realize that necessary truth is a very strong kind of  
truth. It is truth where its mere possibility to be false is unthinkable, or, to put 
2
it in less psychological terms, it could not be admitted as a true possibility.   Based 
on this account, every sentence that is necessarily true cannot be made true 
by fact, since every occurrence of  fact can be just a coincidence. The proof  
of  necessity must be shown prior to the fact. This is a tremendously heavy 
epistemological burden while there is no clear benefit for carrying it. We can 
continue to rely on the laws of  nature without claiming that these laws are 
necessarily true. 
 Indeed, many of  us might never feel any need to possess such truth. 
Members of  scientific communities have long embraced this pragmatic 
attitude. Scientists are hardly bothered by the lack of  absolute certainty of  
their findings, as expressed by the following dictum from Henry Poincare, a 
prominent nineteenth century scientist. “It is far better to predict without 
3
certainty, than never to have predicted at all.”   It is natural then for the 
Popperian admission of  the tentative nature of  sciences to be regarded by 
most scientists nowadays as part and parcel of  scientific practice.
 The old ideal of  necessary truth is also dangerous. Firstly, it misleads us in 
understanding the value of  science. It makes us consider the tentative nature 
of  science as a sign of  weakness that automatically puts scientific knowledge 
on par with astrology or common soothsaying. Even worse, the old manner 
of  thinking drives us to appreciate a mere stipulated relation of  facts, which is 
often made by religion, more than a hypothesized one, which is what science is 
all about, simply because the former is absolutely irrefutable by any 
experience. The fact that the former cannot increase our knowledge about 
the world, since we are simply playing with definitions (for example when a 
priest says that “man is a religious being and if  a being is not religious, then it 
is not a man”), becomes unimportant. 
 However, albeit the mistake is known, insofar as there is no better 
alternative it cannot be abandoned. In this essay I develop an arrangement of  
our epistemic hierarchy that best fits our epistemic aspirations. The basic 
idea is quite simple and hardly new: the ground to rank the importance of  our 
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knowledge consists of  two factors: the degree of  utility to be expected and the degree 
4
of  reliability of  the expectation.   For brevities sake, I would simply call the 
former ‘utility’ and the latter ‘reliability’. In this perspective, the importance 
of  certain knowledge, including the scientific one, is determined by the 
multiplication between its degree of  utility and its degree of  reliability. The idea seems 
to be fairly simple, even though there is an enormous difficulty to understand 
what both notions, utility and reliability, really mean. This essay intends to 
provide a better interpretation of  these two notions. 
 A note in advance: when referring to ‘science’ or ‘scientific knowledge’, I 
mean the paradigmatic cases of  science, such as physics, chemistry and biology. 
1. Utility
 “We want more than mere truth: what we look for is interesting 
truth – truth which is hard to come by [...] mere truth is not enough: 
5
what we look for are answers to our problems.”
 For some, talking about the utility of  knowledge seems to be an 
outrageous scandal. “It is the truth that we must look for,” as it is passionately 
proclaimed. They say that the truth is marked by disinterestedness, since it is 
simply a matter of  ‘fitting the facts’ or ‘copying the reality’. However, what is 
missed from this is the fact that we are never satisfied by merely ‘fitting the 
facts’. We are always looking for some general principle that could connect 
the experienced facts to our future possible experiences. The founder of  
pragmatism, William James, realized this point long time ago by asserting 
that ‘truth’ is basically a matter of  collaborating with realities so as to bring 
about clearer results, and that ‘knowing’ is principally a matter of  getting into 
6
fruitful relations with reality.  
 James remarks that throughout the history of  knowledge the general 
principle pursued can actually be categorized into two opposites. Each has its 
7
own supporter, which James calls ‘the rationalist’ and ‘the empiricist’.   The 
first type is one who looks for general principles that can make the upcoming 
facts always intelligible. This means that the principles will always fit the facts. 
Rationalists do not give much care to the predictability of  future events. They 
solely concern themselves with intelligibility. On the contrary, empiricists are 
only interested in principles that enable us to anticipate future events based 
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on observable facts in the past and the present.
 History clearly reveals that what we pursue is never just a copy of  reality, 
but always a certain way of  copying the reality. It is an act of  choice that cannot be 
free from our interests in life. However, some people are just too fixated with 
old ways of  using words so that an attempt to break with old habits cannot be 
appreciated. This is why James’s remark has often been ridiculed as a self-
refuting statement, since he makes truth analyzable as utility, which clearly denies 
‘truth’ as disinterestedness. 
 To avoid the futile controversy with the language-conservatives, it is 
better to leave the word ‘truth’ altogether behind and move directly to 
‘utility’, or, to be precise, the utility of  knowledge. The utility of  knowledge 
can simply be understood as the serviceability that we seek from knowledge. 
The magnitude of  utility can be measured only after we have clarified the 
type of  serviceability we actually seek. In other words, to be able to measure 
the degree of  utility of  a certain form of  knowledge we must first decide 
what kind of  utility is considered. So what kind of  utility do we actually seek? 
 The above opposition between rationalist and empiricist shown by James 
helps us to realize that there are two contrasting types of  utility that we may 
seek. The first kind of  utility, which can only be served by knowledge-for-
intelligibility, is constituted by the desire to attain pure psychological bliss. It is the 
pleasure of  being protected from any possibility from mistakes, which 
creates a sense of  finality in life. This explains why there are people who so 
willingly and stubbornly hold the statements like “everything happens 
because of  God’s will,” “every existing thing has its function,” or “no 
misdeed goes unpunished.” 
 We cannot deduce any single fact from these statements. However, this 
feature is necessary, because it guarantees beforehand that there cannot be 
anything that can prove the falsity of  these statements. My favorite example 
is how Pangloss, the master philosopher in Voltaire’s Candide, can still 
maintain his belief  that “all things have been created for the best end” and 
defend it vigorously in spite of  all the terrible miseries that he and his friends 
have experienced by simply asserting that we should try harder to look 
beyond the misery to see the hidden benevolent purposes. 
 The second kind of  utility, which can only be served by knowledge-for-
prediction, is constituted by the desire to master our own destiny and to expand our 
power to control the reality so that our real options continuously increase. 
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Knowledge with this form of  utility can be regarded as what W.V. Quine calls 
8
“a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of  experience.”   
Our knowledge in this case is always open to the possibility of  error, i.e., 
when the flux of  experience is not flowing as our ‘device’ predicted. 
Consequently, no necessary truth can be available.
 Science is clearly an enterprise to pursue the second kind of  utility and, 
therefore, its tentative nature becomes natural. The degree of  utility of  any 
scientific knowledge or hypothesis can only be measured on that basis. Could 
it be done objectively? Fortunately, the measurement issue for the second 
type of  utility faces much less difficulties than with the first one, since it 
simply means that we are looking for the degree of  the predictive power of  
the considered knowledge, and the factors that determine it are basically 
embedded in the sentences in which knowledge is expressed. In other words, 
we only need to examine the sentences of  the regarded hypothesis, both its 
syntax and semantics. As a simple example: “the sun will rise every morning” 
clearly has a higher degree of  utility than “the sun will rise tomorrow 
morning” because it enables us to predict more.
 Before going into a more detailed account of  the determinant factors of  
the degree of  utility, two things must be noticed when discussing ‘the degree 
of  utility’. Firstly, there is always a potential gap between the degree of  utility 
expected and the degree of  utility actually received. And secondly, what we can 
measure in advance is only the degree to be expected. The degree of  utility 
actually received is solely determined by how things actually work then and 
hence incalculable. This gap explains the importance of  ‘reliability’, because 
it is never enough just to have knowledge with a high degree of  expected 
utility; the expectation itself  must be reliable. For example, even if  the degree 
of  utility of  ‘every animal is black’ is higher than ‘every raven is black’, but 
considering reliability, it would be irrational to value the former sentence 
higher than the latter, since the former is, we know, completely unreliable. 
The notion of  reliability itself  will be discussed further in the next section. 
For now, I would continue the discussion on the degree of  utility based on 
the second kind of  utility mentioned above.
 The degree of  utility of  any hypothesis is determined by several factors, 
which are the hypothesis’s level of  determinateness, its range of  relevancy, its 
range of  explanatory domain and its level of  precision. These factors will be 
elaborated below:
i. The level of  determinateness: knowledge with the second kind of  utility 
will always stipulate some kind of  relationship among certain kinds 
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of  observable objects, although sometimes not in direct manner, but 
by using the medium commonly called ‘theoretical object’. The 
relationship itself  could be stipulated in various ‘levels of  
determinateness’. The highest level of  determinateness comes from 
the hypothesis that asserts something in the form of  ‘every x is y’ or 
‘for every x there will be y’, which Carl Hempel calls the hypothesis 
of  a universal form. It enables us to predict the occurrence of  y each 
time we observe x. The lower level of  determinateness comes from 
the hypothesis that only asserts something in the form of  ‘for every 
certain number of  x occurrence, y occurs in a specified percentage’, 
9
which Hempel calls the hypothesis of  a probabilistic form.   It only 
enables us to predict the amount of  y occurrences after we have 
observed x in a certain amount of  times. The lowest level would 
come from the hypothesis that asserts something in the form of  
‘whenever x, y is possible’, which I call the hypothesis of  a possibilistic 
form. This is the lowest one, since we could not make any prediction 
about the actual occurrence of  y, no matter how many times we have 
observed x. In short, there are three level of  determinateness. It is 
either universalistic, probabilistic or merely possibilistic. 
ii. The range of  relevancy: the range of  relevancy is the extent of  
spatiotemporal context where the stipulated relationship by the 
regarded hypothesis is effective and where prediction can be 
deduced. Knowledge with the widest range is the one that is 
universally relevant, without any spatiotemporal limitation. The 
universally relevant hypothesis does not need to be the ones 
expressible in a universal sentence. A hypothesis such as “there is 
90% probability that the sun rises every morning,” or “there is a 
possibility that the sun rises every morning,” is as universally relevant 
as “the sun will rise every morning.” We also must be careful not to 
misunderstand what universally relevant is as something that 
stipulates the relationship of  all the observable things in the world. 
This misunderstanding comes from confusing the range of  
relevancy with the third factor below.
iii. The range of  explanatory domain: the totality of  the kinds of  observable 
objects that fall under the relationship stipulated by the hypothesis is 
the explanatory domain of  that hypothesis. It must be noticed that 
our knowledge could have a narrow (exclusive) explanatory domain 
but universally relevant, or, on the contrary, a totally inclusive domain 
but narrowly relevant.
338
MELINTAS 24.3.2008
iv. The level of  precision of  the prediction: would the regarded knowledge 
enable us, at least in principle, to predict a single unique outcome (the 
maximum precision), or would it only enable us to predict outcomes 
within a limited range of  variation, and how tight would the limit be?
 It is true that the weight of  each factor cannot be decided in a pure 
objective manner, and thus it must be admitted that comparing the degree of  
utility of  different hypotheses cannot always be done objectively. 
Nevertheless, there are cases when comparison can be made in an 
uncontroversial manner, which is when a certain hypothesis, at least, 
outweighs the other at some factor, but does not lose at any other factor. 
Such is the case with science. Scientific knowledge shows a superior degree 
of  utility compared to other kinds of  knowledge, at least on point number ii 
and iii, while, in regard of  the other factors, it also does not show any 
inferiority to the other types of  knowledge. 
 The superiority of  the scope of  relevancy can be clearly seen by the fact 
that scientific knowledge is basically knowledge about laws, and that 
scientific laws always have the form of  what Popper calls ‘strictly universal 
statement’, which is the statement that claims to be true for any place and any 
10
time.   This maximum range of  relevancy explains why scientific laws can do 
what a mere accidental generalization cannot do, which is, as stated by 
Hempel, “a law […] can support subjunctive and counterfactual conditional 
statements about potential instances, i.e., about particular cases that might 
11
occur, or that might have occurred.”   With regard to the explanatory 
domain, the wider range of  scientific knowledge is demonstrated by the fact 
that the object referred in every sentence of  basic scientific laws is never a 
certain individual or type of  natural objects only. Instead, they are theoretical 
objects that cover several kinds of  natural objects.
 Some readers might think that by recognizing the two kinds of  utility of  
knowledge I am indeed trying to build a model of  harmonious coexistence 
between science, which is the superior source of  the second kind of  utility, 
and other sources of  knowledge, be it religion or idealistic philosophy, which 
is considered as the superior source for the first kind of  utility. I make no 
such attempt here, because coexistence is impossible. The contradictoriness 
of  the desires that constitute each kind of  utility should be quite obvious; to 
pursue the second kind we must have the courage to be fallible; to embrace 
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incessantly some degree of  doubt in our heart and to let go any hope for 
metaphysical comfort. So in the end we could only consistently pursue one 
of  them. Which one then should it be? My answer is definitely the second 
one, but unfortunately to give a complete defense of  my position would need 
a separate essay. 
2. Reliability
 We can simply understand reliability as the justifiable degree of  belief  in a 
hypothesis’s truth. Knowledge is only reliable if  it is justified to give a degree 
of  belief  that is high enough to make it as the basis of  our actions, although 
we cannot be absolutely certain about its truth. Truth is just another name for 
a hypothesis with a high degree of  reliability. To express this idea 
mathematically, we can simply say that a reliable hypothesis (hypothesis with 
a high degree of  reliability) is the one that we are justified to hold b (belief) > 
0.5. The notion of  reliability saves us from the temptation to make the 
following careless inference: if  the truth of  all hypotheses is not necessary, 
the correct degree of  belief  to be given to each one must be equal.
 The notion has its root in the ordinary psychological fact that among the 
claims of  which we cannot give a full degree of  belief  (b=1), since their truth 
is uncertain, we give a different degree of  partial belief  (0<b<1) to each 
claim, as could be easily seen in some gambling situations. ‘Reliability’ 
originates from our need to refine this psychological tendency. We want our 
degree of  partial belief  to be objective, and not determined by our 
psychological liking. It means that the degree of  belief  is the one that is 
indeed reasonable to be given, as remarked by Stephen Toulmin, 
“trustworthiness, reliability, these are what distinguish an ‘objective’ estimate 
12
of  the chances of  an event from a mere expression of  confident belief.”  
 So far its importance seems convincing. The notion of  reliability can only 
truly be significant if  there is clarity on the matter of  applicability. In other words, 
how can we actually determine the degree of  reliability of  the considered 
hypothesis? On this matter, there are many controversies. The multitude of  
solutions offered can generally be categorized into two conflicting 
perspectives. The first type is the quantitative-probabilistic view, which defines 
reliability as something determined by truth-probability of  hypotheses, which 
is quantifiable rigorously from acquired evidences. Comparing the reliability 
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of  several hypotheses simply means comparing their respected values of  
truth-probability based on the facts observed. The highest one is the most 
reliable one. 
 It is very important to acknowledge the difference between the truth-
probability of  hypotheses, which some thinkers prefer to call the ‘probability of  
hypotheses’, and the hypotheses of  probability or statistical hypotheses. Rudolf  
Carnap, who states the difference clearly for the first time, names the first 
concept of  probability ‘logical/inductive probability’, and the second one 
13 
‘statistical probability’.  The latter concept solely deals with the probability 
of  events to occur, while the former one concerns the probability of  
hypotheses to be true.
 The second perspective is the qualitative view, which understands the 
reliability of  hypotheses as a matter of  the competence of  the hypothesis to 
fulfill certain qualitative requirements in its relationship to the facts. Different 
versions of  qualitative requirements have been given, for example, by Karl 
14 15 16
Popper,   Ronald Giere,   and Hilary Putnam.   The important aspect to be 
noticed from the requirements is that they are for good reasons called 
‘qualitative’, because they are irreducible to any quantitative concept. So it is 
not like ‘heat’, which is reducible to the Celsius or Fahrenheit scale. An 
example is Popper’s idea of  ‘corroboration’. The corroboration of  a 
hypothesis for Popper cannot be determined only by looking at the number 
of  times the hypothesis has passed the test against facts, since we must also 
look at the sincerity of  the test, and this sincerity clearly is not something that 
we can define quantitatively, as Popper states: “the requirement of  sincerity 
17
cannot be formalized.”
 Which alternative gives a better account of  reliability? To find the answer 
we must first be clear about what we seek, because there is indeed room for 
equivocalness in ‘reliability’. When we talk about “the justified degree of  
belief  to be held,” we could mean either “the degree of  belief  that we are 
obliged to hold,” or merely “the degree of  belief  that we are permissible to 
hold.” Because of  the equivocalness, we should distinguish between the two 
senses of  reliability: between the strong sense, which deals with the obligatory 
degree of  belief, and the weak sense, which only deals with the permissible 
degree. 
 The more ambitious project, of  course, is to pursue reliability in the 
strong sense. And it is our starting point. How are we able to determine the 
degree of  belief  that people must hold? Here, the probabilistic approach 
proponents have a clear advantage, since the only credible reason to oblige people to 
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hold a specific degree of  belief  on some hypothesis is that it reflects the hypothesis’s actual 
probability of  truth. In other words, if  we seek to be able to determine reliability 
in its strong sense, then we must take the probabilistic perspective as our 
basis, whether we like it or not. 
 However, being the only promising approach does not guarantee that the 
probabilistic-quantitative view is truly able to give a satisfactory account of  
reliability in its strong sense. To be hailed as satisfactory, the probabilistic 
approach must be able to fulfill two basic requirements. Firstly, correctness, 
which means that the truth-probability being measured is indeed regarded as 
crucially important for us in determining the magnitude of  our degree of  
belief. Second, relevance, which means the truth-probability measurement 
must be applicable to all kind of  hypothesis, especially the ones with a high 
degree of  utility. Can the probabilistic approach succeed? Unfortunately, the 
answer is no; it cannot, as I will demonstrate below.
 The first way that can be tried to measure the truth-probability of  
hypotheses is by using the ‘frequency’ interpretation of  probability, as 
commonly used in statistics. In this interpretation, probability is regarded as a 
matter of  determining how often the hypothesis will be true in the total number of  cases 
where the hypothesis is relevant (see above on relevancy). This type of  probability 
theory seeks to measure the frequency of  cases in which a certain hypothesis 
will be true within the total number of  cases where the hypothesis is relevant. 
The totality of  relevant cases itself  is usually called the ‘reference class’ of  the 
hypothesis. Another important point is the number of  cases, within the 
reference class, that must be distributed randomly. It means that we cannot 
identify for sure in which case, within its reference class, the hypothesis will 
be true. 
 Hence, under this interpretation, when we say that the truth-probability 
of  the hypothesis “every raven is black” is 80%, what we mean is that the 
hypothesis will be true randomly for 80% of  all ravens (the total ravens from 
the past, present and future). We may be tempted to think that the above 
sentence is identical with saying that the truth-probability of  the hypothesis 
“80% of  raven is black” is 100%. But to do that is to confuse the probability 
of  hypotheses with the hypotheses of  probability. Truth-probability only 
expresses the amount of  support given by existing evidences.  
 Statistics has shown that this kind of  truth-probability can be ascertained 
by the method of  ‘interval estimates’. The method enables us to infer a 
hypothesis with a certain limit of  precision (usually called confidence interval), 
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which has a certain degree of  truth-frequency (commonly called confidence 
level) for its reference class, although we only observe a small part of  the 
18
reference class.   There are indeed several cases where the statistical 
inference has shown to be successful, especially related to public polling. 
However, this success is limited to certain kinds of  hypotheses alone. To see 
the reason, we only need to remember that the statistical inference can only 
be done as long the small observed part of  the reference class, which is called 
19
the sample, is indeed representative of  the class.   
 What is needed to have the representative sample? Contrary to what 
some people may suppose, the size of  the reference class itself  does not need 
to be definite. Nassim Nicholas Taleb gives an eloquent formulation to the 
necessary requirement, which is that the reference class must be an exemplar 
20
of  ‘the Mediocristan world’.   Mediocristan world in nothing but a land of  
mediocrity, where we can be confident that the variety observed cannot 
differ much from the variety existing in the whole land. Some cases can be 
safely considered as Mediocristan beforehand, such as when we deal with the 
public opinions for yes/no questions, or with the frequency of  a certain 
number of  dice to show up after being thrown. Yet, a lot more cases in this 
world can only be regarded as exemplifying the opposite of  Mediocristan 
world, which Taleb calls ‘the Extremistan world’. This is the situation where, 
21 
as reminded by Taleb, “one single number can disrupt all your averages.”
Just looking at our social life, we can discern several ‘extremistan’ 
phenomena, such as wealth or book sales. This shows that the statistical 
inference based on the frequency interpretation fails to fulfill the 
requirement of  relevance.
 However, there is another possible form of  probabilistic theory, which is 
based on the possibilistic interpretation of  truth-probability. In this 
interpretation, the truth-probability of  hypotheses is understood as a matter 
of  determining in how many possible worlds the hypothesis will be true within the 
totality of  possible worlds given from the evidences. Let me give an illustration to 
elucidate: suppose we know in the beginning that there are twenty people in 
the class and that John is one of  them. Then, let us imagine that one 
particular person is called from the class. The truth-probability of  the 
hypothesis “John is the person called from the class” will surely be 1/20 or 
5%, which means that from twenty cases made possible by our initial 
evidence, it will only be in one of  them that our hypothesis is true. 
 Carnap’s theory of  logical probability is just another name for this kind 
of  probabilistic theory. The adjective ‘logical’ is suitable since the 
determination of  the truth-probability, as we can see above, is purely a matter 
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of  logical inference. “Logical probability,” as Carnap maintains, “is a logical 
relation somewhat similar to logical implication; indeed, I think probability 
22
may be regarded as a partial implication.”   By partial implication, Carnap 
refers to the condition where the existing evidence cannot conclusively prove 
either the truth or the falsity of  the hypothesis. It can only show the 
possibility for the hypothesis’s truth.
 The problem that comes to the fore with this type of  probabilistic theory 
is the typical feature of  every logical implication, which is that the 
information contained in the conclusion cannot be richer than the one 
contained in the premises. Consequently, it seems that this account of  
probability will never be able to measure scientific hypotheses because 
scientific laws contain more information than what can be contained in all 
empirical data. The problem of  relevance haunts us again. Nevertheless, 
there have been on-going sophisticated attempts since Carnap to save the 
theory from that problem by modeling the relation between the evidences 
and the truth-probability of  hypotheses as a triadic relationship, which is the 
relation among the evidences, the hypothesis’s degree of  truth-probability 
and our linguistic framework.
 I am not interested in examining the prospect of  these attempts for now, 
because I see the more fundamental problem of  this type of  theory lies 
elsewhere, which is in the point of  correctness. To understand the problem we 
only need to pay more attention to the fact that we do not have any good reason to 
say that what is more possible to happen will certainly happen more often. When we say 
something is possible, we are simply saying that it can happen regardless of  
the frequency of  its actualization. We are entitled to hold the claim of  the 
possibility of  ‘X’ to exist—God, for example—although the existence of  
God has never been actualized. Consequently, there is no guarantee that two 
possible things will actually happen more often than just a single possible 
thing.  
 On the other hand, when we give a high degree of  a belief  on a certain 
hypothesis, we always expect that the frequency of  its truth is high. Frank 
Ramsey offers a good description: “suppose his degree of  belief  in p is m/n; 
then his action is such as he would choose it to be if  he had to repeat it exactly 
23
n times, in m of  which p was true, and in the others false.”   Since the higher 
value of  possibility cannot give any guarantee about the truth-frequency, its 
magnitude has no clear signifance to our decision in choosing our degree of  
belief.
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 The complete failure of  the probabilistic-quantitative approach, while at 
first it seems promising, leads us to moderate our ambition, i.e. to be satisfied 
with the weak sense of  reliability. This moderation gives us a better 
appreciation of  the qualitative perspective, what we still can try now is to set 
some qualitative standard, which we find adequate, that ought to be fulfilled 
by any hypothesis so that it is permissible for us to hold as reliable. The 
adequate qualitative standard gives us the permit that not only optimally, 
even though not perfectly, helps us avoid falsity, but it also needs to be 
conducive to new discoveries of  truth and thus to the improvement of  
human knowledge. 
 To formulate this kind of  standard, it is important to learn from our 
history of  knowledge, especially about how new truths are found and 
elaborated throughout history. We cannot pretend to know a priori which 
standard will indeed enhance our epistemic activities. Based on the historical 
consideration, I propose two rules that are sufficient to be adequate 
standards of  reliability:
I.  To be permissible to be held as reliable, or, in other words, to be given 
a high degree of  reliability, a hypothesis must have not been 
disconfirmed in its explanatory domain.
ii.  If  every hypothesis, after being disconfirmed in its old explanatory 
domain, can still find a new domain where it is still safe from 
disconfirmation, then it is permissible to hold the hypothesis as 
reliable in its new explanatory domain.
 Now, one may object to these rules because they seem too plain or 
generous, since, essentially, they only say that we are not justified to hold a 
falsified hypothesis as reliable. They permit us to rely on any hypothesis, as 
long it has not been proved wrong in whatever domain. I admit both the 
plainness and generousness, but it must be noticed that these qualities do not 
make the rules easier to follow. Those two rules, albeit their lenient 
appearance, are actually quite tough for every hypothesis, because, although 
we may legitimately say that we can negotiate with empirical facts, it must be 
noted that facts are always hard negotiators. The so-called ‘social sciences’, 
such as economics and sociology, are still struggling to find hypotheses that 
can survive the two rules of  reliability.
 Only if  we go into the paradigm cases of  sciences, for example physics, 
we can find hypotheses that still prove their mettle against facts. The 
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epistemic priority of  science has become clear then, for it is not only the best 
source of  knowledge with a high degree of  utility, but also our best source of  
reliable knowledge. 
__________________________
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